… no, non è tutto ciò in cui posso sperare dopo le scene patetiche allestite dai presidi di facoltà nell’ateneo torinese.
Mentre quella faccenda rimane in sospeso (sospeso di cassa?), mi sono intrattenuto ed informato con un lungo articolo pubblicato dal The Atlantic (non esattamente una rivista di sinistra), opera di Simon Johnson che, date le credenziali…
a professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, was the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund during 2007 and 2008
… non pare esattamente un emulo di Che Guevara o di Fidel Castro.
L’analisi sulle crisi economiche che hanno investito le nazioni negli ultimi quindici anni è impietosa e, onore al merito, leggibilissima.
In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay.
Pur concentrandosi sugli eventi americani, l’articolo mette in luce alcuni punti sui quali varrebbe la pena di riflettere.
In primo luogo – dove sono i responsabili?
In a primitive political system, power is transmitted through violence, or the threat of violence: military coups, private militias, and so on. In a less primitive system more typical of emerging markets, power is transmitted via money: bribes, kickbacks, and offshore bank accounts. […]
American financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital—a belief system. Once, perhaps, what was good for General Motors was good for the country. Over the past decade, the attitude took hold that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country. […]
One channel of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington.
Già.
Industriali che si danno alla politica, politici che sono anche consulenti altamente retribuiti di aziende.
Suona familiare?
From this confluence of campaign finance, personal connections, and ideology there flowed, in just the past decade, a river of deregulatory policies that is, in hindsight, astonishing
Già.
Ma allora, perché non andare a prendere i responsabili e fargliela (letteralmente) pagare?
Big banks, it seems, have only gained political strength since the crisis began. And this is not surprising. With the financial system so fragile, the damage that a major bank failure could cause […] is much greater than it would be during ordinary times. The banks have been exploiting this fear as they wring favorable deals out of Washington. Bank of America obtained its second bailout package (in January) after warning the government that it might not be able to go through with the acquisition of Merrill Lynch, a prospect that Treasury did not want to consider.
Chi ha causato il crash ora viene ricattato dai suoi complici.
Perché se le banche chiudono, è il ’29 tutto da capo.
Paura.
Articolo estremamente interessante, che getta un po’ di luce sulle pareti del tunnel lungo il quale stiamo viaggiando alla massima velocità possibile.
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